In this paper we introduce the development of aframeworkfor testing safety-critical embedded systems based on the concepts of model-based testing. In model-based testing the test cases are derivedfrom a model of the system under test. In our approach the model is an automaton model that is automatically extracted from the C-source code of the system under test. Beside random test data generation the test case generation uses formal methods, in detail model checking techniques. To find appropriate test cases we use the requirements defined in the system specification. To cover further execution paths we developed an additional, to our best knowledge, novel method based on special structural coverage criteria. We present preliminary results on the model extraction using a concrete industrial case study from the automotive domain.
Introduction
Our work was motivated by the increasing occurrence of failures in embedded systems in the automotive domain causing worldwide recalls of cars. Due to the increasing capacity of processors, the functionality and thus the complexity of the embedded system software is growing. Because embedded systems are often used in safety-critical applications, where failures can cause crucial damage to people, creatures or the environment, testing is extremely important to ensure the quality and reliability of the embedded systems. Sophisticated and mature testing techniques using formal methods are of common use in areas of high safety-criticality, for instance transportation, avionics, or aerospace [1] . In other application domains formal methods for testing are only starting to gain ground. eThis work has been supported by the FIT-IT research project "Systemnatic test case gelnerationL for safety-critical distributed embedded real tim[e systems with different safety integrity levelLs (TeDES) "; the project is carried out inL cooperationl with TU-Graz, M[agnLa Steyr, alnd TTTech.
Using formal methods within our testing framework has the big advantage that the complete system behavior can be described in a formal, thus unambiguous way. The limits of the applicability of formal methods are given by the difficulty to use them for software systems of high complexity.
The testing framework we are developing consists of two main parts: First we build the automaton model of the system under test. This is realized by automatically parsing and analyzing the source code. Once we have built the model, we can use it as a basis for our test case generation methods.
Test data is generated in following ways: We generate test data randomly to cover execution traces of the system fast and easily. Test cases for testing a specific system property are found by means of model checking techniques. Within our framework we use model checkers to find concrete execution paths of the system that correspond to requirements defined in the system specification. The input and output values of these executions paths yield concrete test cases.
The article is organized as follows: In Section 2 we characterize our testing method. In Section 3 we introduce the general concepts of model-based testing and the scenario for our testing framework. In Section 4 we describe in detail how we build the automaton model of the system automatically by extracting it from the C-source code. Section 5 deals with the test case generation methods using formal methods and the applicability of model checking techniques for the test case derivation. In Section 6 we discuss the preliminary results of our approach by evaluating it on a concrete case study. Finally we give an overview on related work and conclude with a summary and the plans for future work.
Testing Safety-Critical Applications
Testing is a process centered around the goal of finding defects in a system for debugging or acceptance reasons [2] . The ultimate goal is to prove the absence of failures in the system behavior. In general it is not possible to test a system exhaustively, that means to execute all possible system configurations and thus find and fix all defects in a reasonable time. For functional testing it is essential to provide suitable test cases to the system under test. The execution of these test cases should prove, whether a system requirement defined in the specification is valid or violated by the implementation.
We characterize our framework as dynamic, gray box, systematic, and automated test- 
Testing Safety-Critical Systems
The requisites for the quality of safety-critical systems are defined in several standards, for instance DO-178B [3] or IEC 61508 [4] .
The developed testing framework is oriented on the IEC 61508 standard. IEC 61508 is a standard for functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safetyrelated systems. It provides a list of guidelines for the testing process and multiple testing methods. Some of the relevant issues for our framework are:
-Structure-based Testing: Structure-based testing aims to apply tests which exercise certain subsets of the program structure [4] . [4] .
The testing framework we are developing aims to meet concrete coverage criteria for the system under test. As described below, we will use finite state machines to model the system behavior and we will use formal methods to prove the integrity of the system and to direct our test case generator to derive test cases. Several kinds of models can serve as a basis for the generation of test cases. For instance, test cases can be created based on UML-models of the system. Furthermore, lots of other modeling languages for the formal specification exist, for example, synchronous languages (e.g., Esterel or Lustre), Petri nets, transition systems and automata-based formalism (e.g., finite state machines). For an overview please refer to [6] .
The model for the test case generation can be built before the development of the software, as a supplement parallel to the software development process or separated from the software development process. Hence, different scenarios for generating test cases are possible, as described by Pretschner et al. [7] :
1. A common model can be used for both, code generation and test case generation. This scenario is used especially with respect to the model-centric development paradigm, like MDA (model-driven architecture) [8] . 2. A second scenario is concerned with extracting models from an existing system.
Once the system is built (e.g., hand coded), one creates a model manually or automatically, and this model is then used for test case generation. 3. A further approach consists of manually building the model for test case generation, while the system is again built on top of a different specification. 4. The last noteworthy scenario involves two distinct models, one for test case generation, and one for code generation.
An essential issue in model-based testing is the automatic verdict for the test cases.
When the same model is used for code generation and test case derivation, the test cases can also be run against the application. But the following problem occurs: The verdict, i.e. the expected output for the test data, is deduced from a model that maps completely to the code. The resulting test cases executed against the system will all pass the test procedure, because possible erroneous behavior from the code is directly reproduced in the model. In this scenario it is not possible to produce test cases that prove if the implementation is valid against the model. Therefore most model-based testing scenarios need an additional manually built model. This model is assumed to be valid against the specification. The test cases derived from this model can be run on the object code, thus errors in the implementation can be detected [9].
Our Approach to Model-Based Testing
In our framework we derive the test cases from an automaton model that is extracted from the source code. The test cases are generated from the model and the requirements of the specification (see Figure 2 ). The system behavior is defined in the specification and the requirements. SRS means safety requirements specification, which is a subset of the requirements, focusing on the functional safety of the system. Based on the specification, an implementation model is built (in our case study with Matlab Simulink) and the source code for the system is automatically generated with a code generator (TargetLink from dSpacel). For the testing framework the requirements are formalized, i.e. the requirements defined in the system specification are translated into temporal logic formulas. These formulas are the main part of the test case specification. The test case specification also contains information about coverage metrics, for instance, aimed coverage criteria, like branch coverage or MC/DC. The extracted model, which is automatically extracted from the source code, and the test case specification serve as a basis in our framework for the generation of test cases. The model and the formalized requirements are provided to the model checker. The idea is to find traces in the automaton model of the system that represent execution paths corresponding to specific requirements. The input and output values of the resulting traces are used as test cases. These test cases are then applied to the system under test. See also Section 5.
In our approach the verdict, i.e. the expected output for the test data, is given by the requirements. The model is assumed to be valid against the specification (see also Section 5). The resulting test cases running on the target platform prove, whether the system behaves consistent to the model and thus consistent to the specification.
In the following, we describe the model extraction process and the formal test case generation methods.
Model Extraction
Extracting the model from the source code is extensive but can be easily automated. Our model extraction framework is based on a framework that has been developed for measurement-based worst-case execution time analysis within the project Model-Based Development of distributed Embedded Control Systems (MoDECS) [10, 11, 12] . The model extraction is done in the following steps [10]:
1. First the C-code is parsed and the syntax tree is generated by static analysis (see Figure 3) . Depending on the complexity of the program, optional single blocks (modules of the system) can be identified to ease the analysis.
2. The resulting syntax tree is used to generate the controlfiow graph (see Figure 4 ) and the decision tree (see Figure 5 ) for further analysis within the final testing process (e.g., path coverage analysis). 3. The syntax tree is used to generate the automaton model of the system. This is realized by sequentially processing the syntax tree and interpreting the semantics of the single statements. 4. The description of the automaton is given in an automata language (for instance, the modeling language of the SAL or NuSMV model checker).
We give a simple example to demonstrate our model extraction: We start with a small C-program. In this program the function test takes two arguments x and a and contains two composed if-else conditions. Depending on the current values of x and a, the variable x is assigned with the values 10, 20 or 100. The resulting syntax tree consists of approximately 100 nodes, of which we have to deal with 16 statements for the generation of the automaton model. Figure 3, 4 and 5 show the syntax tree, the control flow graph, and the relating decision tree for the example. The analysis of the syntax tree yields the automatically generated NuSMV model.
Example:
NuSMVModel [16] . In the following we sketch the test case generation methods that we will use in our testing framework. The first method "Property-based test case generation" is similar to the use of so-called "never-claims" as described by Engels et al. [15] . The second method ""relevance-based test case generation" is, to our best knowledge, a novel technique we developed as a complementary test case generation method.
Prpry-ae TetCsX Gnrto
Thbai idao_hstcnqei ofn etcssfrlctosi h oe hr h proert fIs ai.T idsc etcsswt h oe hce,w tt htfi not feasible within the system model. The negated formula -if is provided to the model checker. The model checker searches the state space of the model to prove if this formula is valid or not. In the case of a violation of the assertion -if the model checker provides a path on which f is true (a counterexample). This path is one instance of an execution trace of the program, where the property f holds and can thus be used as a test case to test the requirement f (see Figure 6) . The model checker delivers a counterexample, if the property we want to test is valid. As a by-product we are also performing formal verification. We only get counterexamples that we can use as test cases, if the property is valid in the model. In the case of a violation of the property, we know that the property is not valid in the model. Because the model can be directly mapped to the source code of the system, we know in the case of a violation that a requirement from the specification is violated by the implementation. This points to the fact that the failure in the implementation has to be corrected.
In general, model checkers produce only one counterexample, where a property is violated. When we consider only the requirements from the specification this yields only a few execution paths of the system. One possibility to get more paths is to modify the model checker to produce more than one counterexample. However, this modification could yield a huge number of paths, many of them testing the same property. Thus, instead of using this modification, we developed a complementary test case generation method described in Section 5.2.
Relevance-Based Test Case Generation
When using the property-based test case generation described above, it can happen that a property f is valid in many different locations of the model. In such a case it is desirable to generate test cases targeted to those locations where the property is most relevant, e.g., variables occurring within the formula of a property f influence directly the generation of the output of the model.
In relevance-based test case generation, the principle of how the model checker generates test data is similar to the above method. We provide an assertion g to the model checker and the model checker searches for counterexamples that violate g. The only difference between the above method and this approach is the meaning of g. With this approach, g is not simply the negation of f, the property we want to verify by testing. Instead, g formally states that a certain location x of the model cannot be reached. Thus, the counterexample generated by the model checker provides input data to reach the location x is chosen as one of these locations where variables of f can directly influence the generation of output. The interesting instances of location x are calculated by a prior static program analysis phase. For example, if a variable of f is used at a certain location x to decide, whether the output value should be incremented, then x is an interesting code location for a test. Based on g, the model checker can calculate those test data for which x will be reached. This approach provides an effective search for test cases, in the sense that it focuses only on code locations where the output is influenced by variables from the property to be tested.
To illustrate how such an assertion g can be formulated, let us assume that we have found the assignment x 20 in the source code example of Section 4 to be an interesting location to be tested (in reality, this code does not generate an output). Since this location corresponds to the state "sequence-nr=5" in the model, we can use the assertion (c) to get a path to this location: analyze the source code of our case study and build the control flow graph; it yields nearly 8000 paths. We are on the way to complete the implementation of the model extraction with all features that yields an automaton model representing the overall correct semantics of the C code and can thus be directly processed by the model checker for the test case generation.
Besides the test case generation methods described in Section 5 we use random test data generation to reduce the workload of the model checker.
Related Work
In Broy et al. [17] various aspects of model-based testing are described in detail. One chapter of it, written by Pretschner et al. [7] , is about Methodological Issues in ModelBased Testing, which inspired our research on model-based testing. Several existing testing tools are also based on the concepts of model-based testing, for an overview see [18] . Mirko discusses model-based testing of embedded systems on examples from the automotive domain [9] .
A general introduction to model checking can be found in Clarke et al. [19] . The ideas of using model checking techniques also for testing aim back to the mid '90s, for instance [20] . A survey on formal testing techniques can be found in [21] . The test case generation techniques are described in detail in [22] . Since then many works are concerned with using model checking techniques for testing purposes by means of producing counterexamples, for instance Beyer et al. [23] . Amman et al. use model checking to generate tests from specifications [24, 1] . Also Gargantini et al. [25] generate tests from requirement specification. Grabowski discusses issues concerning specification-based testing of especially real-time distributed systems [26] . Engels et al. [15] are using "never-claims" for test case generation.
The way of how the model is build depends on how the test cases are finally generated. We know about model checkers that can process source code directly, for instance BLAST5, described in Henzinger et al. [27] . CMBC6 is a bounded model checker for ANSI-C programs, described in [28] . The model checker SPIN7 provides a tool that translates C-code into the input language of SPIN PROMELA, see [29] . Also MUTT8 developed at Microsoft Research is a tool for automated test generation, but mainly for unit testing, see [30] . Extracting the automaton model from the source code is based on works of Wenzel et al. [10] . Schroder et al. [31] discusses a few modeling aspects for the automated test case generation.
Techniques for applying abstraction to models are described in [32, 33, 34, 35] . Clarke et al. are working on "counterexample-guided refinement" [36] . Ball et al. deal with abstraction especially in relation to the falsification of branching-time and linear-time temporal properties [35] .
The introduced methods have been applied to a few case studies: Chandra et al. [37] used software model checking for an industrial case study. The inhouse card study is a well exercised case study [38] . An evaluation of model-based testing is given by Pretschner [39] or Paradkar [40] , who studied the fault detection effectiveness of modelbased testing. Testing purposes especially concerned to the automotive domain are discussed amongst others in Ranville and Black [41] or Mirko [9].
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we introduced the development of a testing framework that is based on model-based testing. The model is automatically extracted from the source code of the system under test. The test cases are derived from this automaton model by producing counterexamples by means of model checking. Besides using the "never-claim" properties directly obtained from the specification (property-based test case generation), we presented a novel test case generation method (relevance-based test case generation) that focuses on testing those code locations where variables from the property to be tested influence the output generation.
Besides describing the conceptual aspects of our testing framework, we demonstrated the functionality of our implementation for the model extraction on a small sample code. Furthermore, we showed technical details of extracting the automaton model from the C source code of an industrial case study.
In our future work we plan to integrate some abstraction mechanisms to reduce the state space of the automaton model of study to improve the performance of the introduced test case generation methods.
